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v

ARGUMENT
Huntington-Cleveland's appeal presents three grounds for reversal. First, the trial
court should not have allowed USF1 to leapfrog the priority of its water rights ahead of
Huntington-Cleveland. USF is barred from so doing by the equitable doctrines of laches,
estoppel, and waiver. Second, the trial court should not have permitted USF's end-run around
the ongoing General Adjudication of the San Rafael River.2 Statute, public policy, and case
law all militate against it. Third, USF has forfeited many of its water rights.
I.

USF ADMITS ITS DELAYS AND RESULTING EQUITABLE DOCTRINES.

USF does not dispute that it delayed any assertion of senior priority for the 100, 22,
and 9 years respectively as set forth in Huntington-Cleveland's opening brief. Nor does it
dispute the effect of these delays on Huntington-Cleveland. Instead, it seeks to deflect the
results of its delays by arguing the same equitable doctrines of Laches, Estoppel and Waiver
against Huntington-Cleveland.3 However, USF's

the-best-defense-is-a-good-offense

approach ignores basic facts, established at trial, which eviscerate the equitable claims it

1

As IPA's and ANR's water rights all came from USF, these parties, unless
otherwise indicated, will be referred to collectively herein as "USF."
2

In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water,
both Surface and underground, within the Drainage Area ofthe San Rafael River in Sanpete,
Emery, Garfield, and Wayne Counties in Utah, Civil No. 1435, Seventh District Court in and
for Emery County (the "General Adjudication").
3

USF's observation that the holding sought by Huntington-Cleveland would lead to
an "absurd result" (USF Brief&\ 10) displays a fundamental misunderstanding. A finding that
USF was barred would return the parties to their respective pretrial status quo, and would
allow priority to be determined within the framework of the San Rafael General
Adjudication, as sought by Huntington-Cleveland.
Reply Brief
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1

attempts to throw back at Huntington-Cleveland.
II.

Huntington-Cleveland is not Barred by Laches, Estoppel, or Waiver.
USF's equitable-defense attack may be divided into two prongs: (1) Huntington-

Cleveland should have taken action against USF's filing of various applications over the last
100 years, and (2) Huntington-Cleveland should have taken action to prevent USF's actual
use of water. However, Huntington-Cleveland had no reason to take action on either prong.
A.

Huntington-Cleveland's Diligence Claim is for up to 10 CFS.

USF's argument regarding Huntington-Cleveland's 10 cfs displays a lack of
understanding of Cedar Creek and how water and water rights are administered in Utah.
First, both USF and the trial court misinterpreted Huntington-Cleveland's diligence claim to
the water of Cedar Creek. Cedar Creek, like many Utah streams, has a highly variable flow.
The unchallenged evidence at trial was that during a single season, or even a single day, the
flows of Cedar Creek could and did fluctuate from 1 cfs to more than 10 cfs.4 HuntingtonCleveland's use of Cedar Creek and its resulting diligence claim recognized this reality. The
diligence claim is for the entire 10 cfs, when such water was available.5 Of course a water
4

Dr. Edward Geary testified about the varying, and typical low flow of Cedar Creek:
"[T]he normal flow of Cedar Creek is rather small, three or four second feet probably most
of the time, which is easily and simply diverted... into the canal, but of course periodically,
in rainstorms, large floods can come down there." (R. at 2788, Tr. 891.)
5

This principle very logically allows for beneficial use of high flows and flood water
which are normally not available in the stream. Former State Engineer, Dee Hansen, testified
that with paper water rights there are "more filings per water than you have actual water.
And in many cases that happens in Utah. On most streams there are more filings than
there is actual water . Even during flood times in some cases. But in this case
[Huntington-Cleveland] has a total often cubic feet per second." (R. at 2791, Tr. 1684
(emphasis added).)
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2

user can only be responsible to take and use water that is available. See Rocky Ford Irr. Co,
v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108 (Utah 1943),6 but there was no evidence at trial
that Huntington-Cleveland knew of USF's water use or had any reason to blame USF rather
than mother nature for the variable flows.7
B.

Huntington-Cleveland's Use of Cedar Creek Since 1929.

Second, despite USF's "dry dam" opening argument (R. at 2785, Tr. 24), the evidence
was that Huntington-Cleveland has enjoyed the use of the water of Cedar Creek from at least
1929 to the present, based upon eye-witness testimony. USF did not deprive HuntingtonCleveland of its Cedar Creek Water Right. Whatever USF did up stream, HuntingtonCleveland always had its Cedar Creek water at its point of diversion into the Cleveland
Canal. (R. at 2788, Tr. 884-890; R. at 2791, Tr. 1727; see also R. at 2788, Tr. 964-69; R. at
2789, Tr. 1173-77; R. at 2789, Tr. 1203-05; R. at 2790, Tr. 1228-43.)8

6

US Fuel also cites College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Forklrr. Co., 780
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989), which says that as long as a water user has enough water at its point
of diversion to satisfy its right, it cannot complain about upstream senior and junior uses of
water. US Fuel claims that this means that unless Huntington-Cleveland received all 10 cfs
of its right, all of the time, it was obligated to protest. This is not true; in fact, College Irr.
says nothing about a lack of water due to fluctuating stream flows.
7

In arguing this point (USF Brief at 10), USF presents a blocked quotation which it
attributes to College Irr., 780 P.2d at 1244. The quoted language, however, does not appear
in College Irr.—nor, it seems, anywhere else. Huntington-Cleveland has no idea where the
language USF "quotes" comes from.
8

USF's equitable defenses claims, based on the Desert Land Patent Depositions, 1893
Water Certificate, and 1910 Monsen Affidavit & Proof, suffer from the same infirmities as
its other equitable claims. Also, there is no evidence that Huntington-Cleveland was
deprived of its water during this ancient period, see College Irr., supra, or that water was
actually diverted and put to use, except for the exact dates of these documents.
What these documents do show is that USF acquiesced in a 1907 priority and it only
Reply Brief
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3

C.

The Failure to Determine whether the Blackhawk Mine Water was
Tributary to Cedar Creek is Fatal to USF's Equitable Claims.

Third, and most importantly, USF's successful efforts to prevent the trial court from
determining both whether or not the Blackhawk Mine water was tributary to Cedar Creek and
extent of all water rights on Cedar Creek, precludes the equitable doctrines that USF now
seeks to invoke. USF successfully resisted Huntington-Cleveland's efforts to have Cedar
Creek adjudicated as part of the San Rafael General Adjudication, UCA §§ 73-4-1 etseq. (R.
at 86,145, 581), or via a mini-adjudication of Cedar Creek under UCA § 73-4-24 (R. at 626,
642,645,729). USF also prevailed on a motion in limine which prevented the trial court from
determining whether or not the water issuing from the Blackhawk Mine portal and flowing
into Cedar Creek was naturally tributary to Cedar Creek. (R.at 1280, 1282, 2785, Tr. 10.)
The equitable doctrines of Laches, Estoppel, and Waiver, as well as the various cases
cited by USF all presuppose some duty to speak or act and failure to speak or act.9 USF's
preventing the determination of what water comprises Cedar Creek and the allotment of the
rights to the water of Cedar Creek, makes it impossible to find that Huntington-Cleveland

attempted to irrigate 80 acres of the Cedar Creek Ranch, not 135.66 acres.
9

Tanner v. Provo Res. Co., 98 P.2d 605, 702 (Utah 1940) (Silence when conscience
requires one to speak may establish equitable estoppel.); Orient Mining Co. v. Freckelton,
74 P. 652, 654 (Utah 1903) ("It is elementary that he who fails to assert his alleged rights,
when in good faith he should have done so, is estopped from afterwards asserting the
same."); Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039, 1044 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (oral approval and failure to object constitutes a "textbook example" of estoppel.);
Clark v. Kirby, 55 P. 372,374 (Utah 1898) ("He who is silent when conscience requires him
to speak, shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to keep silent,"
citation omitted); Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976) (estoppel
applies when a party is silent when he ought to speak).
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had some duty or obligation, as suggested by USF, to either take action against USF's water
use or to protest its administrative filings.
It is impossible to determine if Huntington-Cleveland had a duty to protest USF's
water diversion and administrative filing activities, without determining what water
constituted Cedar Creek. Whether or not the water emanating from the Blackhawk Mine
portal is naturally tributary to Cedar Creek is precedential to any determination that USF was
using Cedar Creek water to Huntington-Cleveland's detriment.
USF's actions prior to the trial preclude the application of the equitable doctrines it
now seeks to invoke against Huntington-Cleveland. In any event, however, as set forth in
Huntington-Cleveland's opening Brief (and undisputed by USF's response), the State
Engineer's Memorandum Decision approving the use of Blackhawk Mine water by USF (Ex.
37-F, attached hereto as Addendum "X") recognized the tributary nature of the Blackhawk
Mine water and protected Huntington-Cleveland's first right to the water of Cedar Creek.
D.

Huntington-Cleveland Acted as Any Senior Water Right Holder Would
be Expected to Act.

USF's argument that Huntington-Cleveland should have participated in various
administrative proceedings on USF's applications, and should have pursued judicial appeals
from such proceedings, presupposes that Huntington-Cleveland had the savant ability to
somehow predict that after Huntington-Cleveland had enjoyed 100 years of water-right
seniority, USF would suddenly leapfrog its water rights into a senior position.10
10

The seminal doctrine of priority—"first in time is first in right," Salt Lake City v.
Silver Fork Pipeline, 2000 UT 3, ^[34, 5 P.3d 1206 (citing UCA § 73-3-1)—fully protected
Huntington-Cleveland as the senior appropriator on Cedar Creek. Also, such actions by USF
Reply Brief
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USF argues that Huntington-Cleveland should have brought USF's forfeiture to the
attention of the State Engineer in an administrative proceeding. Huntington-Cleveland,
however, could not raise forfeiture in a state-engineer proceeding. Such an action would have
been meaningless and fruitless. In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P.2d 745,751 (Utah 1996),
this Court held that the State Engineer cannot decide issues beyond the scope of his
administrative powers. Moreover, UCA § 73-l-4(l)(b) clearly declares that "a water right
may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare forfeiture is commenced within 15
years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years." Forfeiture is clearly
the province of the courts, not of the State Engineer.
E.

USF cannot Show Reliance on Any Alleged Inactivity by HuntingtonCleveland.

Even if USF was able to show that Huntington-Cleveland had some duty to speak or
act, which it cannot, its equitable claims against Huntington-Cleveland must fail for lack of
any reliance by USF. For USF To invoke estoppel, laches or waiver, it must show that it
relied to its detriment on Huntington-Cleveland's alleged inaction. This also USF cannot do.
The only expenditure that it can point to in the record is the construction of its transbasin
pipeline; that pipeline, however, to transport water from the Blackhawk mine portal to Miller
Creek, was constructed and illegally used {see UCA § 73-3-3(9)) prior to the reciept by USF
of any approval by the State Engineer, which USF now alleges that Huntington-Cleveland
should have acted to prevent or appealed (R. at 2785, Tr. 90-91; R. at 2787, Tr. 607-08; Exs.

as its filing for nonuse permits (USF Brief at 14) were not detrimental to HuntingtonCleveland, and therefore Huntington-Cleveland had no reason to protest them.
Reply Brief
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33-D & 33-E). There was no evidence at trial of any reliance by USF on any administrative
approval or failure of Huntington-Cleveland to appeal such administrative approval.11 Also,
USF sold the Cedar Creek Ranch without any water rights and separately sold its water rights
to ANR, prior to the resolution of this action. (R. at 2792, Tr. 1768.) These are hardly the
actions of one relying upon Huntington-Cleveland's inactivity.
III.

IT IS USF, NOT HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND, WHICH IS BARRED BY EQUITY.

A.

The 1984 Proposed Determination Bars USF's Claims.

As a separate and independent ground, Huntington-Cleveland demonstrated in its
opening brief that the ongoing San Rafael General Adjudication and USF's failure to timely
object to the Proposed Determination therein bar USF from obtaining a judicial
determination in this separate action that it had a senior priority to Huntington-Cleveland.
Throughout the long proceedings in the trial court, Huntington-Cleveland tried in vain to
bring this action into compliance with Utah law by seeking to have it heard either as part of
the ongoing General Adjudication or to conduct a mini-adjudication of Cedar Creek under
UCA § 73-4-24. (R. at 86,145, & 581, and 626,642,645, & 729, respectively.) USF resisted
these efforts at every turn and persuaded the trial court to allow this matter to go forward
separately, without either the State Engineer or other Cedar Creek water users as parties. (Id.)
11

USF's arguments about the downstream Price River Drainage water users and the
Price River Proposed Determination (see USF Brief at 20 n.8) suffer from numerous fatal
flaws. First, there are no facts in the record to support these arguments. Second, neither
downstream Price River Drainage water use nor the Price River Proposed Determination
were raised below. Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, f 9 n.4, 26 P.3d 212. Third, HuntingtonCleveland, which has no water rights in the Price River drainage, never received that
Proposed Determination by mail as required by UCA § 73-4-11, and thus the 90-day
objection period has never begun to run and no bar exists against Huntington-Cleveland.
Reply Brief
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1.

USF Failed to Timely Object.

USF seeks to excuse its late and defective objection to the Proposed Determination
on several grounds. Obviously fatal to all of USF's excuses is that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to overlook USF's failings in the separate General Adjudication proceeding.
a. The Stahl Case. USF appears to believe that in

Stahl v. Utah

Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480,481-83 (Utah 1980), this Court held that a notice of claim
filed two-months late "substantially complied" with the notice-of-claim statute. {USFBrief
at 28.) Based on this, USF asserts that its objection to the 1984

San Rafael Proposed

Determination, filed five days late nevertheless "substantially complied" with UCA § 73-411 's 90-day deadline. (Id.) The problem is that the trial court lacked any jurisdiction to
excuse the tardy filing in a separate matter, but even if it had, Stahl does not say what USF
wants it to say, and it does not excuse USF's tardy objection in the General Adjudication.12
In Stahl, after an accident involving a UTA bus, Stahl had been contacted by an agent
for UTA's insurer and had given him a statement and a release. Three months later, over two
months after the statutory 30-day deadline, Stahl had filed a notice of claim against UTA.
This Court held that there had been substantial compliance with the statutory directive—not,
as USF would have it, despite its lateness—but because it wasn't late. Stahl's contact with
UTA's insurer on the day of the accident, held the Court, satisfied the notice requirement.
Obviously, the Stahl situation is nothing like that of the present case. USF filed

12

The five-day-late objection made no mention, in any case, of HuntingtonCleveland's priority over USF. USFfiledan additional objection five years later where it first
raised the priority issue. (Ex. 48-C, see Addendum "S.")
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nothing before the 90-day deadline to which, like Stahl, it could point as "substantial
compliance." Quite to the contrary, USF failed to file anything until five days after the
deadline had passed.13
b. Jensen v. Morgan,

USF attempts to distinguish

Jensen v.

Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992),fromthe present dispute by arguing (a) that "[i]n Jensen
there was no independent action for monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief
as there is [in the present case]," and (b) that the objection in Jensen was three years too late
rather than USF's one day. (USFBrief at 29.)14
Neither the monetary damage claim against Huntington-Cleveland, which USF lost
and chose not to appeal, nor the declaratory or injunctive relief distinguish the present matter
from this Court's ruling in Jensen. Despite what other claims are brought, Jensen upholds
the 90-day objection deadline in UCA § 73-4-11. The 90-day deadline is a bright-line limit
on the filing of objections. Taking the statutory 90-day restriction to mean "whenever, but
13

USF also argues that, because it mailed its tardy objection to the district court on
March 2, 1984, its protest was only one day late. USF claims that its "filing was effective
upon mailing pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 5(b)(2) (1977) then in effect."( USF Brief z\ 28 n. 18)
(USF plainly means URCP Rule 5(b)( 1) (1977); Rule 5(b)(2) was a rule dealing with resident
and foreign attorneys.) In any event, even setting aside the fact that by March 2nd, USF was
already one day late, URCP Rule 5(b)(2) (1977) had to do with service upon other parties,
not filing with the courts, which was covered by 5(d) & (e). Rule 5(e) defines "[fjiling [w]ith
the [cjourt" as "filing . . . with the clerk of the court" or with the judge. USF's protest, in
short, was untimely filed with the Seventh District Court on March 6,1984, a fatal five days
after the 90-day deadline had come and gone.
14

USF's protest was in fact/zve days late, not one. Although USFfiledits protest with
the State Engineer's office on March 2, 1984 (the 91 st day), UCA § 73-4-11 requires that
protests be filed with the clerk of the district court before whom the general adjudication is
pending. USF's protest was not filed with the clerk of the Seventh District Court until March
6, 1984 (the 95th day).
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less than the three-years' tardiness found fatal m Jensen"—quite aside from abandoning the
legislature's explicit instructions—would undo the entire protest process, and render the
water filing system utterly unpredictable and chaotic at best. Too late, in short, is too late,
whether it be five days or five years, and USF's protest was too late and, consequently, of no
effect.
2.

The Integrity of the General Adjudication Process.
a. The End-Run.

As Huntington-Cleveland noted in its opening brief

(pp. 30-31), the most troubling aspect of USF's position is the notion that one can
circumvent a General Adjudication and his or her failures therein simply by filing a separate
action. This Court's allowing specific disputes to be heard outside the context of a pending
general adjudication cannot be construed as carte blanche to undo the whole statutory water
allocation scheme. Consider, for instance, the Jensen case, supra, which USF is so eager to
distinguish. If we take USF's position, Jensen—and indeed anyone—who found himself in
the same position in which USF now lies, could entirely circumvent dismissal (or any other
undesirable consequences) by filing a new lawsuit in another forum. A victory there would,
again, assuming we accept USF's perspective of the matter, entirely erase the effects of the
General Adjudication.
Allowing such end-run tactics would also entirely unravel the general-adjudication
fabric. Why bother with such a careful, comprehensive, and deliberate system, the whole
purpose of which is to "prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to provide a
permanent record of all such rights by decree," Jensen, 844 P.2d at 289, when anyone who
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wishes to avoid his failings therein can simply step around or push aside the carefully crafted
proposed determination—little more, in such a confusing regime, than a well-woven but
unnecessarily busy tapestry—and weave a different set of conclusions in another court?
b. Hicken v. North Ditch. The Court of Appeals faced this very issue
in Hicken v. North Ditch Irr. Co., Case no. 960360-CA (Utah Ct. App., March 20, 1997), an
unpublished memorandum decision15 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "Y").
Should this Court agree and deem it controlling, Hicken will effectually moot USF's entire
argument that it is not barred by the Proposed Determination.
The Hicken plaintiffs filed suit in the 1990s, seeking to increase their stockwatering
rights, arguing that the 1960 case which had addressed their irrigation rights was silent as to
stockwater rights. The Court of Appeals agreed the 1960 findings were ambiguous, but held
that any ambiguity had been cured by the publication of the 1984 proposed determination,
which clearly stated that the plaintiffs possessed a certain amount of water for stockwatering,
and no more. The Court of Appeals held
Plaintiffs did not object to the proposed determination within 90 days of
service, as required under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). See Murdock v.
SpringvilleMun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147,1150 (Utah 1994). Therefore, because
the proposed determination shows that plaintiffs' stockwatering claim was
previously adjudicated, they cannot prevail on the present cause of action. See
Green River Adjud. v. United States, 17 Utah 2d 50, 52, 404 P.2d 251, 252
15

Despite their unpublished status, such decisions, as this Court has recently made
clear, are "part of the law of this state" and, "unless and until contravened
may be cited
to the degree that they are useful, authoritatively and persuasively." Grand County v. Rogers,
2002 UT 25, f 16, 44 P.3d 734. Huntington-Cleveland, which learned of the existence of
Hicken only in early May, notes that counsel for USF clearly knew of the case (having
represented the defendants/appellees therein), but did not disclose its existence as it seems
would be required by URAP Rule 37(a).
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(1965) (emphasizing res judicata applicable to general adjudications of water
rights). The trial court therefore properly dismissed plaintiff s [sic] complaint.
See Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427,430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating dismissal
proper only if the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief "under the facts alleged or
under any set of facts they could prove to support their claim").
Hicken, slip op., p.2.
Under the Hicken rule, USF obviously has no case at all. Having failed to timely file
their objection to its priority in the San Rafael Proposed Determination, which explicitly
recognizes a senior right in Huntington-Cleveland to the first 10 cfs of Cedar Creek, USFs
claims to the contrary are barred as res judicata by Hicken}6
B.

USF May not Rely on UCA § 73-4-24.

In citing to UCA § 73-4-24 and Murdock, supra, for the proposition that the Court
may hear mini-adjudications for a portion of a drainage during the pendency of a General
Adjudication, USF has obviously forgotten its own procedural maneuvering prior to trial.
USF originally brought this action as a mini-adjudication, citing to UCA § 73-4-24 (R.at 001,
f 42). However, when Huntington-Cleveland pointed out to the trial court that USF had
failed to follow the requirements of UCA § 73-4-24 (by failing to petition the trial court to
seek its approval to bring a mini-adjudication, and also by failing to give notice to other
Cedar Creek water users, besides Huntington-Cleveland), USF sought and received
permission to amend its Complaint and deleted its citation to UCA § 73-4-24 (R. at 214,217,
545). Thereafter, Huntington-Cleveland itself sought to convert this matter to a mini16

The use of res judicata would not seem to be an exact fit, of course, since the
Proposed Determination in neither Hicken nor the present dispute has been reduced to a final
judgment and decree. The principle, however, no matter how enunciated, clearly applies in
both instances and operates to prevent USF's end-run tactics.
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adjudication. USF, however, objected and its objection was sustained. (R. at 626, 642, 645,
729.)
After these two distinct actions, USF cannot now seek to characterize this action as
a mini-adjudication under UCA § 73-4-24, so as to justify its end-run around the General
Adjudication process.17
IV.

US FUEL HAS FORFEITED MANY OF ITS WATER RIGHTS THROUGH NONUSE.

Huntington-Cleveland's third alternative ground for appeal to this Court is that even
if USF is not barred by either equitable doctrines or by its attempted end-run around the
General Adjudication, and the trial court's holding regarding priority is upheld, USF
forfeited many of its water rights under UCA § 73-1-4.
A.

USF Is Properly Entitled to Only 160 Acre-Feet to Irrigate the Cedar
Creek Ranch.

In arguing against partial forfeiture, USF places itself in an awkward position
regarding its beneficial use of water on the Cedar Creek Ranch. On one hand, it asks this
Court to uphold the trial court's finding of a 542.64 acre-foot water right sufficient to irrigate
135.66 acres (R. at 2758, ^f 3). On the other, it seeks to excuse its decades of admitted
irrigation of 40 acres or less of the Ranch (USF Brief at 34, fhs. 21 & 22). Obviously, these
conflicting positions are mutually exclusive and cannot both be upheld.
17

Also, neither Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. District Court ,110 P.2d 344
(1941), nor Smith v. District Court, 256 P. 539 (1927), justify USF's end-run. Neither
addresses a situation, such as that in the present case, where a Proposed Determination has
been entered, and both cases predate UCA § 73-4-24, which allows mini-adjudications to
proceed during the general adjudication, providing an orderly mechanism for individual suits
to proceed which embrace the same issues as the General Adjudication. USF, however,
moved forward outside of the authority of UCA § 73-4-24.
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UCA §73-1-3 succinctly declares that "[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state." Therefore, if there is only enough
water in Cedar Creek to irrigate 40 acres (i.e., 160 acre-feet ("af')), Water Rights 93-904,
93-3525,93-1089,93-267, and 93-3680 must accordingly be reduced from a combined total
of 542.64 af to 160 af. If more water was available, then USF's failure to use this water must
result in its forfeiture. Under either scenario, USF's Cedar Creek rights must be drastically
reduced.18
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that USF somehow actually did irrigate the
135.66 acres the trial court awarded it, USF's permitted flow amounts to rather less than a
mere 2 cfs. Duty on an acre of land in Emery County is approximately 4 af. (R. at2789, Tr.
993.) Four af over 135.66 acres totals 542.64 af per year. A flow of one cfs over one year
gives 724 af; 542.64 af per year thus equals .75 cfs/year. Of course, irrigation water maybe
used only during the seven-month irrigation season—April to October—so the flow would
actually be 1.28 cfs per irrigation season (.75 cfs +- 7/12).
In other words, even accepting USF's unsubstantiated 135.66 irrigated acres, USF
could not possibly be beneficially using more than 1.28 cfs. Now, longstanding Utah law
declares that "[b]eneficial use . . . [is] the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water" in Utah, UCA § 73-1-3, and, based upon this provision, that
no one is entitled to a greater quantity of water for any particular use or
purpose than is reasonably necessary to supply the needs of the claimant for
18

This is not the case of an occasional drought preventing use of the full water right,
a situation discussed in Rocky Ford, supra. This is a persistent, ongoing condition over the
last 50 years.
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the specified purpose. This is true regardless of the quantity that has been used
for such purpose and the length of time it may have been used....[:]
"The actual amount of water needed for the use to which it is to
be applied is the limit to which a party is entitled to water for
irrigation, regardless of the fact that he may have actually
diverted much more water for a long period of time."
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 164 P. 856, 859 (Utah 1916) (quoting Little
Walla Walla Irr. Union v. Finis Irr. Co., 124 P. 666, 666-67 (Ore. 1912)). Obviously, then,
any water USF may be pouring across its "ranch" beyond 1.28 cfs—that is, beyond the duty
limit—is, by definition, running waste.19
In sum, even granting USF's asserted 135.66 acres, arguendo, USF may be awarded
a maximum of only 1.28 cfs. No more is necessary. The facts adduced at trial, however, show
that USF irrigates only about 40 acres on its "ranch." (See table x in opening brief.) The duty
algorithm20 applied to this sum yields a total of only 0.38 cfs per irrigation season. Thus, far
from the entirety of Cedar Creek which it claims, USF has beneficially used only about 0.38
cfs for many years. And this is all it may legally be permitted hereafter.
B,

USF Misstates the Law Regarding Partial Forfeiture.

On page 35 of its brief, USF declares that "[t]his Court has never decided whether a
partial forfeiture of a water right can occur, even though some justices have addressed the

19

Overflow water, moreover, since it serves no beneficial end, must be forfeited at the
end of five years, by operation of UCA § 73-3-4.
20

40 acres x 4 af (duty) = 160 af. 160 af - 724 (af/cfs/yr) = 0.22 cfs/year. 0.22 cfs/year
+ 7/12 = 0.38 cfs/season.
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possibility."21 This Court has twice addressed (though not decided) the partial forfeiture
question—in Rocky Ford, supra, and in Eskelsen v. Town of Perry ,819 P.2d 770 (Utah
1991)—and has both times approved of partial forfeiture.
The question first came before this Court in Rocky Ford, wherein the issue before the
Court was whether the defendant, Kents Lake, had failed, for a continuous period of five
years,22 to beneficially use the entirety of the 1,660 acre feet of water to which its water
rights entitled it. Ultimately, this Court concluded that no forfeiture had taken place, since
the longest period that Kents Lake had failed to use its entire 1,660 acre feet had been only
four years. The Rocky Ford Court nonetheless declared that, had there been a continuous five
year period "during which Kents Lake failed to use material amounts of available water, we
should hold that a forfeiture of at least part of itsrighthas occurred by virtue of this nonuse,"
135 P.2d at 112, "thus acknowledging that the statute allowed for partial forfeiture," Robert
W. Swenson, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Parti, 5 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 193 (1984).
The partial-forfeiture issue came before this Court once again in Eskelsen, 819 P.2d
770. The question in Eskelsen was whether Perry's leasing of part of a water right resulted
in a statutory forfeiture of the portion leased. The trial court had ruled that partial forfeiture
did not exist in Utah. 819 P.2d at 775 n9. Noting the remarks of the Rocky Ford Court, the

21

Interestingly, USF did not appeal the trial court's application to USF of partial

forfeiture.
22

At the time, UCA § 100-1 -4 (1943), the predecessor of the present forfeiture statute,
UCA § 73-1-4, provided that "[w]hen an appropriator or his successor in interest shall
abandon or cease to use water for a period of five years the right shall cease, and thereupon
such water shall revert to the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this title."
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Eskelsen Court observed that the trial court's position was untenable, id.:
Such a result would mean that the use of any part of a water right, no matter
how small, would preserve the whole. As a matter of public policy, it might be
prudent to allow partial forfeiture; all of the policy reasons that support
forfeiture as a general principle would be furthered by, and hindered without,
partial forfeiture.
C.

USF Has Forfeited the Winter Stockwatering Portion of Water Right 93267.

USF holds only a single water right under which it may divert water onto the Cedar
Creek Ranch during the nonirrigation (winter) season. Under this Water Right, no. 93-267,
USF may divert 3.8 cfs23 from Cedar Creek onto its ranch for irrigation and stockwatering
purposes. During the nonirrigation season, the water is approved solely for the stockwatering
of 145 head of cattle.24,25 USF, however, admittedly wintered no cattle on the ranch from
1980 through 1989. (R. at 2787, Tr. 591:12-592:15.)
It seems axiomatic under the partial forfeiture doctrine that nine or ten consecutive
years of nonuse of a winter stockwatering right would work a forfeiture of USF's winter
rights to the water. USF, however, argues that since stockwatering is a year-round use,
beneficial use of the water during the irrigation season each year "is sufficient to preserve

23

That's 2,751.2 af (3.8 cfs x 724 af/cfs/yr).

24

Stockwater is measured in equivalent livestock units or ELUs, equal to .028 af per
year. This figure, multiplied by USF's 145 head gives a total annual stockwatering need of
4.06 af per year, approximately 0.00561 cfs. However, the need for the five-month
nonirrigation season (November-March) is only 1.69167 af (4.06af x 5/12), or a mere
0.00234 cfs per irrigation season. That's about 1/1624 of the total, approved flow (roughly
0.00062%).
25

It should also be noted that USF has no other stockwatering rights for the ranch. All
of its other stockwatering rights are for Gentry Mountain. (R. at 1577,ffif30-32, 2754.)
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USF's stockwatering rights against reduction under Rocky Ford" (USF Brief dX 41).26
Nothing could be further from the truth. The Rocky Ford Court was quite explicit in its
declaration that, given five continuous years of "fail[ure] to use material amounts of available
water," a user should suffer "a forfeiture of at least part of its right . . . by virtue of [its]
nonuse," 135 P.2d at 112 (emphasis added). Here, of course, USF most certainly did not
beneficially use Water Right 93-267 for stockwatering during the winter months from
1980-89. That portion is forfeited.
D.

USF Forfeited its Rights by Excessive Waste of Water.

Since water rights are measured and limited by beneficial use, one who "diverts more
water than under this doctrine he is entitled t o , . . . must return such surplus to the stream for
the use of subsequent appropriators." Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal Co.,
174 P. 852, 855 (Utah 1918). USF, however, seeks to excuse its unconscionable waste of
Cedar Creek water (i.e., a ditch loss of 50% or more) by claiming that its practices were
similar to those of other water users. However, in Utah, where "a drop of water is a drop of
gold," Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass 7z., 19 Utah 2d 6,425 P.2d 405 (Utah
1967), a 50% ditch loss cannot be allowed. Ordering USF to line its ditch will force USF to
be more prudent in its water use. See In re Water Rights ofEscalante Valley Drainage Area,
348 P.2d 679 (Utah 1960).

26

USF wrongly declares that Huntington-Cleveland "admits that USF watered stock
during the Spring, Summer and Fall" between 1980 and 1989 (USF5ne/at41). HuntingtonCleveland, however, admits no such thing. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that, from
June through October of the 1980-89 period, the cattle were kept on Gentry Mountain (R.
at 2787, Tr. 593:15-22).
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E.

Water Right 93-3524 Has Been Forfeited.
1.

The Nonuse Extensions do not Preserve Water Right 93-3524.

Rather than attempt to dispute its own admitted nonuse of Water Right 93-3524, in
§ II.H.l of its Brief (pp. 45-46), USF argues, for the first time, that nonuse extensions
granted by the State Engineer prevented its forfeiture of Water Right 93-3 524.27 This is not
the case, however. First, the nonuse extensions USF cites (Ex's. 50-B through 50-J) apply
only to Water Right 93-970, from which Water Right 93-3524 was segregated in November
of 1957 as a result of Change Application No. a268 (Ex. 50-B). An application for extension
of time to resume had been filed in 1953 for 93-970 (Ex. 50-H), but even if this nonuse
extension were applicable to the segregated Water Right 93-3524, it expired in 1958. No
application for extension of time to resume use was filed for Water Right 93-3524 until long
after 1972. Thus, whatever effect state-engineer approval of nonuse extensions may have had
on the validity of Water Right 93-970, it had none whatsoever on Water Right 93-3524,
which would have lapsed into forfeiture after five years of nonuse, in either November of
1962 (five years after segregation) or October of 1963 (five years after the termination of the
nonuse extension then in effect on Water Right 93-970).28
27

Although matters raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief are generally
considered waived, Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^|23,16 P.3d 540, this rule does not apply
where an appellant responds in its reply brief to a new issue raised by the appellee in its
opposing brief, id. at f 24.
28

Second, USF's own proof of resumption of use (Ex. 50-A), filed in August of 1987
and "[cjovering Water Rights 93-970,3524,3525," specifies resumption of both the 0.13 cfs
of Water Right 93-970 and the 1.0 cfs of Water Right 93-3525, but not the 0.37 cfs of Water
Right 93-3524. Thus, even if Water Right 93-3524 had somehow survived USF's failure to
use it after segregation, USF's own proof of resumption admits that its use had not been
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2.

Huntington-Cleveland is not Barred from Pointing Out USF's
Forfeiture of Water Right 93-3524.

The trial court's estoppel finding is erroneous as the pipeline was constructed prior
to any approval for its use ( see § II.E, supra). The State Engineer has no authority to
determine whether a water right has been forfeited through nonuse. Jensen v. Morgan, 844
P.2d at 292 {citing Daniels Irrigation Co. v. Daniel Summit Co., 571 P.2d 1323, 1324-25
(Utah 1977)). Utah law is clear that forfeiture may only be determined by the courts. UCA
§ 73-l-4(l)(b)(I). Obviously, Huntington-Cleveland could not have asked the State Engineer
to deny USF's pipeline applications based on a claim of forfeiture. See Badger, 922 P.2d 745.
Equally, however, judicial review of a State Engineer decision is "strictly limited to
those [issues] which were, or could have been, raised before the State Engineer." Crafts v.
Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983) {citing East Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 300
P.2d 603 (1956)); see also Badger, supra, 922 P.2d 745.
Thus, Huntington-Cleveland did not—because it could not—raise the question of
forfeiture before the State Engineer, nor could it have argued it on appeal to the district court,
as it would have been strictly limited to the issues cognizable before the State Engineer.
USF's assertion that Huntington-Cleveland's forfeiture claims are barred is absurd: how can
Huntington-Cleveland possibly be barred for not raising an issue before the State Engineer
which it was not permitted to raise, and which the State Engineer had no authority to decide?
3.

Illegal Beneficial Use does not Prevent Forfeiture.

resumed by and was not resumed in 1987, nearly 25 years after segregation from Water Right
93-970.
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USF closes its Briefby asserting that the Eskelsen holding29 somehow permits illegal
beneficial use to prevent forfeiture (p.47). Having thus expanded Eskelsen, USF argues that
forfeiture of Water Right 93-3524 was prevented by its use of the water for irrigation at the
ranch, before its change application seeking a right to do so had been approved.
Even assuming however, arguendo, that USF were somehow beneficially using the
93-3524 water at the ranch prior to obtaining approval for such use, Eskelsen does not
recognize illegal water use by private parties as a bar to forfeiture. Even if, like USF, we
were to ignore the fact that the Eskelsen Court explicitly noted both that the constitutional
prohibition and statutory forfeiture "are concerned with entirely different policy
considerations," 819 P.2d at 776, and that it was not "modifying [the] general principle of
strict adherence to the statutory sanctions requiring forfeiture for the nonuse, id. at 776,30
does this Court truly wish to authorize water users to save themselves from forfeiture by
surreptitiously misusing water they cannot put to the beneficial use upon the faith of which
they were granted the right in the first place? Such a conclusion would not only throw Utah's
prior appropriation system into chaos but would also run contrary to this Court's emphatic
29

I.e., that although Perry's leasing of its water rights violated the plain language of
Article XI § 6 of the Utah Constitution, the violation did not necessarily or logically satisfy
the statutory requirements for involuntary forfeiture under UCA § 73-1-4 (being concerned
with entirely different policy considerations from the constitutional provision), where the
Town did not "cease to use" the water, but instead "used [it] for an unconstitutional purpose"
and derived a benefit therefrom. Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 776.
30

See also Baugh v. Criddle, 431 P.2d 790, 791-92 (Utah 1967) ("[M]ore and more
it becomes quite obvious that development of water must require strict adherence to statutory
sanctions, without delay or nonconformance thereto, - lest our whole economy lag to the
detriment of our future. It must be a rare and highly equitable case that should justify a
departure from this principle, - which we do not find in the case here." (Emphasis added.))
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declaration "that an appropriator can[not], without getting the approval of the State Engineer,
change the nature of the use" to which water is applied. Rocky Ford, 140 P.2d at 639.
4.

USF's Stacking of Water Rights does not Prevent Forfeiture.

The use of Water Right 93-3524 on the Ranch is also "stacking" water rights.
Stacking of water rights occurs when one attempts to apply more water rights to a piece of
property than beneficial use can support. This is precisely what USF is attempting to do.
Even though it already has 542.64 af of water under Water Rights 93-904,93-3525,93-1089,
93-267, and 93-3680,3land at most 542.64 af of beneficial use possible at the ranch, it
attempts to stack on Water Right 93-3524 by claiming that if it wasn't used elsewhere, it was
used on the Cedar Creek Ranch. Obviously, such stacking cannot prevent forfeiture. See
UCA § 73-1-3.
F,

Huntington-Cleveland Properly Marshaled the Record Evidence of
Irrigated Acreage at the Cedar Creek "Ranch/9

USF next asserts that Huntington-Cleveland fails to properly marshal the evidence
introduced at trial as to the amount of irrigated acreage at the Ranch. In support of this
contention, USF adduces a table (USF Brief'at 37) listing, as USF puts it, "the evidence that
[Huntington-Cleveland] overlooked,"

id. USF's table lists 11 dates,32 each with a

corresponding figure representing the number of acres purportedly irrigated on the Ranch at
that time. USF's table also indicates a trial exhibit which USF apparently believes
31

The trial court pared these rights down from 917.2 af to 542.64 af (R. at 2198).

32

June 4, 1907; July 10, 1910; August 1, 1912; November 12, 1912; February 26,
1936; October 11, 1957; July 1960; October 1960; April 6, 1962; May 28, 1962; and June
4, 1962.
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corroborates the corresponding date and acreage figure. (USFBrief at 37.)33
The only relevant dates on USF's table run from October 1957 through June 4, 1962,
and are cross-referenced with Trial Exhibits 27G & 32B (Proofs of Change prepared by
USF); 27H & 32C (Maps prepared by USF), and 271 & 32D (the State Engineer's
Certificate). In reality, however, despite the five-year spread of dates, these documents
memorialize only two change applications, the only measurement of water in connection with
which took place in May of 1960. (See Ex's. 27G & 32B.) Self-evidently, measurements
taken in May of 1960 have nothing to do with, and prove nothing concerning USF's use of
water between 1962 and 1968, the period challenged by Huntington-Cleveland. Once again,
then, Huntington-Cleveland was under no obligation to marshal evidence concerning a period
the water use within which Huntington-Cleveland does not challenge.
USF's table and argument simply prove what Huntington-Cleveland set out to show:
that the use of water on the Cedar Creek Ranch was generally, for a period of fifty years,
between 20 and 60 acres, and that USF's Water Right, beyond 120 af for the support of 40
acres, had been forfeited.34
33

The first five dates in USF's table (June 4, 1907, through February 26, 1936) are
entirely irrelevant. Huntington-Cleveland marshaled the evidence concerning irrigated Ranch
acreage in support of the fact that USF has partially forfeited several water rights (
see
Huntington-Cleveland's Brief in Chief at 36-39, & 44). Huntington-Cleveland's arguments
on this point focus on USF's water use—or rather, the lack thereof—during "the 1940s, the
1950s, 1962-68,the 1970s, 1981-1986, [and] 1988-1992."^/. at44.) Huntington-Cleveland
was thus under no obligation to marshal evidence concerning the period from 1907-1936.
34

Multiple, uncontested, five-year forfeiture periods maybe identified throughout the
50-year time frame, and Huntington-Cleveland has properly marshaled all of the evidence
presented at trial in connection with the findings it challenges.
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G.

The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Don Barnett's Testimony.

USF belatedly identified Don Barnett as an expert and filed his expert report 31 days
after the deadline set by the First Revised Scheduling Order (R. at 962, % 3), 13 days after
Huntington-Cleveland had identified its experts (R. 987-89), four days before discovery
cutoff (R. at 962, f 6), and eight weeks before trial. Contrary to well-established practice, and
the trial court's order, USF designated its expert after the designation of Defendant,
Huntington-Cleveland's, and bereft Huntington-Cleveland of its right to properly tailor its
defense to Plaintiffs claims. That USF would assert, as it does (

USF Briefat 38), that

Huntington-Cleveland has not been prejudiced by its untimely expert designation is
astounding.35
The intent of URCP Rule 16 is "to encourage forceful judicial management," Arnold,
846 P.2d at 1310 {quoting 6A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
1531, at 314 (1990)), and the sanctions, including exclusion of evidence, were added to the
rule in 1987 to reinforce this aim.
As for the content of Mr. Barnett's testimony, USF's argument (USF Brief at 37-39)
entirely fails even to address the Turner test for proper rebuttal, discussed in Huntington-

35

In Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993), this Court declared that
"[w]hile scheduling orders should never be so inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies
that may occur, they are necessary... and should not be lightly disregarded." Under URCP
Rule 16(d), should a party fail to obey a date set by a scheduling order, a trial court may
sanction the offending party by excluding the evidence the party intends to present. USF
seeks to avoid the application of Arnold—not by satisfactorily explaining or seeking to
excuse its untimely identification and improper use of Mr. Barnett—but by lamely urging
that, under Rule 16(d), the trial court may, but need not, impose sanctions. (USFBrief at 38.)
Policy and precendent, however, militate strongly against USF's position.
Reply Brief
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Cleveland's Opening Briefly- 41-42, quoting Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021,1024 (Utah
1994)), to say nothing of demonstrating the appropriateness of Mr. Barnett's testimony
thereunder. As this Court explained in Turner, "When the offering party contends that the
undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on
whether the evidence 'sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to
trial.'" Plainly, however, Mr. Barnett's testimony on irrigated acreage was one of the main
points upon which USF dwelt in its case-in-chief. Not only was the irrigated acreage
"reasonably anticipated," it was directly prepared for. Mr. Barnett's testimony was not,
therefore, merely "somewhat repetitive" of USF's case-in-chief ( USF Brief at 43 (citing
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, f23,29 P.3d 683)), it was an integral part thereof, upon which
USF heavily relied.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Appellant, Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company submits that
the decision of the trial court must be reversed, as set forth in the Conclusion to HuntingtonCleveland's Brief in Chief and respectfully requests that this Court so hold.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of July,
NIELSEN & SENIOR
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BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLINO. 91-251 (a-6961) and
NO. 91-316 (a-6963)

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Change Applications 91-251 (a-6961) and 91-316 (a-6963) were
filed by U.S. Fuel Company, seeking the right to change the point
of diversion of 0.942 cfs and 0.58 cfs respectively. Heretofore
these quantities of water have been diverted from January 1 to
. #\
December 31 of each year from the Blackhawk Mine tunnel located ^ ^
at a point South 364 feet and East 894 feet from the NW Corner,
Section 3, T16S, R8E, SLB&M. The water has been used for the
domestic and municipal requirements at the town of Hiawatha, and
for industrial purposes in conjunction with a coal mining operation within the SW1/4SE1/4, Section 27, NW1/4NE1/4, Section 34,
T15S, R8E, SLB&M. Hereafter, it is proposed that the same quantities of water be diverted from the Manway Portal of the King #2
Mine located at a point North 1490 feet and West 98 feet from the
SW Corner, Section 8, T16S, R8E, SLB&M. From this location the
water will be piped to the town of Hiawatha and used for the
municipal and domestic requirements of 67 families, and for industrial purposes as heretofore. The applications were advertised in the Emery County Progress beginning July 20 and ending
August 3, 1972. Subsequent to the public notice, protests were
filed by the Bureau of Land Management and the HuntingtonCleveland Irrigation Company. The initial hearing was held on
November 7, 1973 in Castle Dale, Utah. However, because no decision was rendered and because of the many years which have passed, it was felt that a subsequent hearing should be held. A
second hearing was held on May 8, 1984 in the Emery County Courthouse in Castle Dale, Utah. The applicant was represented by
attorney Robert G. Pruitt, III and Mr. Robert Eccli, Engineer for
U.S. Fuel at Hiawatha. Neither of the protestants were represented at the hearing.
In defense of the applications, Mr. Pruitt indicated that when
the initial water rights were filed, water was, in fact being
pumped upslope out of the Blackhawk Mine and piped to various
storage tanks and used in the town of Hiawatha as previously
stated. As mining progressed, the Blackhawk and King #2 Mines
were joined and thereafter, the water from the Blackhawk Mine was
allowed to run down dip and was collected and conveyed to Hiawatha from the King #2 portal. In the ensuing years, each of these
mines have been abandoned. However, the water is still needed
and is presently being used as indicated on the Change Applications. Therefore, the subject change applications are requesting
that the applicant be given the right to continue to allow the
water from the Blackhawk Mine to flow into the King #2 Mine and
be conveyed to Hiawatha for beneficial use.
Each of the protestants stated in their written protests that
they had prior rights to the water of Cedar Creek, of which the

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CHANGE APPLICATION
NUMBERS 91-251 (a-6961)
and 91-316 (a-6963)
Page - 2 King #2 Mine would be tributary, and [that if the subject change
applications were approved, their rights would be adversely affected. In reviewing each of the protestants water rights, it
was found that the Bureau of Land Management does have a stockwatering right on Cedar Creek prior in time to the the applicant's rights. The Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company also
has a prior right for irrigation purposes located several miles
downstream from the King #2 Mine. However, to the knowledge of
this office, neither of these water rights have been diminished
because of the operation of U.S. Fuel under these two
change applications. Therefore, it is the opinion of the State
Engineer, that the approving of these two change applications
would not adversely affect the right of the protestants on Cedar
Creek.
It is, therefore, ordered and Change Applications 91-251 (a-6961)
and 91-316 (a-6963) are hereby APPROVED subject to all prior
rights and specifically those of the protestants.
This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court
within sixty days from the date hereof.
Dated this 12th day of October, 1984.

DCH:MP:slm
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 12th day
of October, 1984, to:
United States Fuel Company
19th Floor University Club Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Huntington-Cleveland Irrig. Co.
c/o Kenneth J. Brasher & D. B. Allen
Huntington, Utah
84528
Robert G. Pruitt, III
1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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Page - 3 U.S- Bureau of Land Management
P.O. Box 11505
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Mr. Richard Nebeker
4 00 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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By:
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L. MaHboJkin, / S e c r e t a r y
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Before Judges Davis, Bench, and Jackson.
BENCH, Judge:
The 1960 findings state that plaintiffs had used the water
"to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture." Relying on this finding,
plaintiffs contend that only irrigation rights were at issue in
the 1960 litigation. Because the findings are arguably ambiguous
on this point, plaintiffs are entitled to the inference that
stockwatering rights were not at issue in 1960. See Educators
Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 890 P.2d
1029, 1029-30 (Utah 1995) (stating that on review of a trial
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, court views all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff).
We conclude, however, that any ambiguity -in f.hg finri-ingg nr
decree was clar^fi^d by hh<a IQAA prnpncpH Hpt-prmination in the
general ad*judicaf -i on
The proposed determination] a copy oF"*
~Wfti£h was attached to plaintiffs1 complaint, states that
plaintiffs' water rights are based on the 1960 decree and
diligence claim. Plaintiffs' water user's claim, which was filed
during the general adjudication, also refers to the 1960 decree
and diligence claim. The proposed determination provides that

plaintiffs1 claim "is limited to 2/240 interest" in the flow of
water, "which is intermittently diverted by" the claims of
plaintiffs and defendants. It then clearly defines the purposes
of plaintiffs' "2/240 interest": 3.80 acre-feet of water for
irrigation and 1.01 acre-feet of water for year-round
stockwatering. Therefore, the proposed determination
unambiguously shows that plaintiffs have a year-round
stockwatering right that, together with the irrigation right, is
limited to a 2/240 interest in the flow of water. Cf. Provo
River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993)
(concluding ambiguity in decree rendered it unlikely that all
rights were decided in prior adjudication); Orderville Irrigation
Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 285, 409 P.2d
616, 619 (1965) (stating res judicata does not bar action to
determine water rights "where there are uncertainties" in a prior
decree).
Plaintiffs did not object to the proposed determination
within ninety days of service, as required under Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-4-11 (1989). See Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp.. 878
P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). Therefore, because the proposed
determination shows that plaintiffs1 stockwatering claim was
previously adjudicated, they cannot prevail on their present
cause of action. See Green River Adjud. v. United States. 17
Utah 2d 50, 52, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (emphasizing res
judicata applicable to general adjudications of water rights).
The trial court therefore properly dismissed plaintiff's
complaint. See Baker v. Angus. 910 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (stating dismissal proper only if the plaintiffs are not
entitled to relief "under the facts alleged or under any set of
facts they could prove to support their claim").
Affirmed.

j£L>ui to. &£~Js
Russell W. Bench, Judge

James/£. Davis
Presiding Judf^

Nqrman H. Jacksorf-v Judge
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